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Abstract: The paper focuses on private provision of public utilities services located in poor 
countries with a special attention to capture and corruption issues. It confronts Auriol and Picard 
(2002) optimal policy regarding private sector involvement in public utilities with empirical 
evidences on water and electricity in SSA. Consistently with the theory participation of private 
unregulated firms to the supply of services for the middle class and the poor is fairly common in 
SSA. By contrast service to the rich is achieved by public utilities. Theory suggests that prices 
should be high so that the public firms make a profit. Yet piped water, and to a lesser extent 
electricity, are heavily subsidized. This signals a capture problem by the ruling elite. Since the 
ruling elite also designs and implements privatization programs, there is concern about the 
optimality of privatization programs. The paper analyzes the social cost of inefficient (corrupted) 
privatization. It is non-monotone in the opportunity cost of public fund. Because of the fiscal loss 
it represents, privatizing profit centres of public firms entails huge social costs in very poor 
countries. There are hence socially good privatizations and socially very bad ones. The good 
ones are hard to formalize in practice because they are not very lucrative for the private sector. 
By contrast the bad ones are easier to achieve. This explains that they certainly dominate.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Over the last 25 years low-income countries have drastically reduced 
their share of state ownership.1 Governments have privatized public assets 
because of critical budgetary conditions, often as part of macroeconomic 
policy stabilization programs. Between 1990 and 1997 a substantial and 
unanticipated increase in private capital flows to the developing world then 
fuelled the hope that the private sector would be the next provider of 
investments in infrastructure and public utilities in poor countries. Ten years 
later the financial flows involved in the process are sobering.2 Assessment 
of the privatization reforms is mitigated and varies widely depending on the 
assessor. Since they often led to improvements in the financial and 
operating performances of divested firms, specialists tend to think that they 
have been successful. This positive appraisal contrasts sharply with the 
popular view among consumers and taxpayers in developing countries, 
where there is a widespread perception that the reforms have hurt the poor, 
notably through increases in prices and unemployment, while benefiting the 
powerful and wealthy, notably through corruption. For instance in a 2001 
survey of 17 Latin American countries 63% of participants disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement: "The privatization of state companies 
has been beneficial" (The Economist July 28th-August 3rd 2001, p. 38). 
Similarly in Africa, reforms have been qualified as "re-colonization" due to 
the participation of foreign investors in many cases. Consumer 
dissatisfaction raises serious concern regarding the social benefits yielded 
by privatization in very poor countries. The paper aims to address this issue. 
It focuses on the welfare implication of private sector involvement in the 
provision of utilities services. It analyses the impact of corruption in 
privatization decisions regarding public utilities located in developing 
countries. 
 
                     
1 Megginson and Netter (2001) estimated that between 1980 and 1996 public ownership went 
from 16% to 8% of GDP. 
2 Since the Asian financial crisis, private investors, major commercial banks and international 
organizations have retreated from the sector. The withdrawal has been amplified by the 
weakening of the global infrastructure industry. Infrastructure finance to poor countries from 
international sources has declined by at least 50%. Yet at their 1997 peak, they were just 3.6% 
of total new international bond, loan, equity issuance (World Bank 2004). International private 
capital flows are not going to fill the huge investment gap in poor countries infrastructures 
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Anecdotal evidences suggest that the corruption problem in privatization 
programs is real. However it is hard to uncover and to quantify empirically. 
The paper relies on Auriol and Picard (2002) normative analysis to address 
the corruption issue and its welfare implication. It proceeds in two steps. 
Auriol and Picard (2002) study the relationship between the financial 
constraints of a country and its optimal industrial policy in infrastructure and 
utilities industries. It provides a benchmark against which governments’ 
industrial policy can be assessed. The null hypothesis is that government 
follows the optimal industrial policy derived in the paper. This supposes that 
they are benevolent while managing their public utilities. In a first step, the 
hypothesis is tested by confronting the model theoretical predictions with the 
available empirical evidences on demand, prices, and industrial organization 
in water and electricity utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The advantage of 
focusing on utilities is that their services are priced and prices, contrary to 
corruption, are observable. The paper hence compares the optimal pricing 
scheme to the actual prices in water and electricity in several African 
countries. It concludes that capture is going on in public utilities. 
To be more specific the theoretical predictions of Auriol and Picard 
(2002) vary with the profitability of the market segments. In unprofitable 
segments, Auriol and Picard (2002) predict that there is no service. As 
implied by the theory, the total level of service (private and public) is much 
lower in Sub-Saharan Africa than in advanced economies. In 2004 access to 
improve water sources was estimated to be around 56%.This level was 
sensibly the same than peer poor countries from South-Asia. In 2002 access 
to electricity was estimated at 24% of the total population by the International 
Energy Agency. This figure has to be compared with 48% in peer low 
income countries (IEA 2004). The absence of service in unprofitable market 
segments is consistent with Auriol and Picard (2002) results. That is, it is 
consistent with an efficient management of scarce public funds. However the 
fact that Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per capita consumption of 
electricity in the world signals a public management problem.  
In low profitability market segments, the theory predicts that the service 
provision should be left to private providers. Consistently with the theory, 
participation of private firms to the supply of utilities services is fairly 
common in Africa. In peri-urban area, the private informal sector is bridging 
the gap between public services and the needs of the middle class and the 
poor. Local private entrepreneurs have understood all the profit they could 
make out of the fairly inelastic, uncompressible part of the demand. Water 
supply to the poor is in some African cities a textbook case of monopoly 
abuse. In electricity self sufficiency based on private generators and on 
privately own and operated small electricity networks close the utilities gap 
at a high cost. One lesson from the analysis below is that in light of the 
financial constraint faced by African governments, it is a second best to let 
private providers serve the less profitable segments of the market. It is 
indeed better to have a privately own and operated utility service, even with 
monopoly distortion, than no service at all.  
Finally, the theory predicts that profitable segments have to be served by 
public utility at high prices. The utilities’ goal should be to extract rents out of 
the wealthy part of the demand to subsidize access to the middle class and 
the poor and/or for fiscal relief. Consistently with this result, public utilities 
services are limited to big cities and wealthy neighbourhoods. They focus on 
rich consumers so that in general only the fifth quintile (i.e., the 20% 
wealthiest consumers) benefit from a connection to public utilities. However 
piped water, and to a lesser extent electricity, are heavily subsidized. 
Subsidized prices for public utilities are in total contradiction with the optimal 
pricing scheme derived in the normative analysis. In other words, public 
utilities are not optimally managed. This either implies that the government is 
incompetent or not benevolent. Since the price mechanism has been 
captured by the ruling elite, we favour the latter conclusion. The social cost 
of the capture is high. Public utilities are losing money. They are unable to 
invest. The problem is particularly acute in electricity where access rate is 
half of the access rate in peer low income countries.3  
The first part of the analysis establishes that the price setting mechanism 
has been captured by the ruling elite. We are hence obliged to reject the null 
hypothesis that African governments manage efficiently their public utilities. 
The problem is that the ruling elite is not only responsible for fixing prices in 
public utilities, it also designs and implements privatization programs. It is 
thus legitimate to be sceptical regarding the optimality of privatization 
programs. In a second step, the paper studies what happens if the 
government privatizes, possibly in exchange of bribes, a profitable firm’s 
segment which, according to the normative analysis, should remain public. 
The paper derives analytically the social loss which depends on the 
opportunity cost of public funds. The loss formula is shown to be U shape 
and to diverge with the opportunity cost of the public funds. In other words, 
the social cost of corruption in privatization programs is much higher in poor 
                     
3The lack of power acts as a brake on the African economy because energy consumption is 
one of the most significant determinants of growth. For instance energy was the leading driver 
of growth in fast growing countries such as Brazil, Turkey and Korea (IEA 2004). 
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countries than in intermediate revenue ones. The intuition for this result is 
the following. Privatizing profit centers of public utilities represents a 
permanent loss of revenue for the government. In very poor countries the 
revenue of the government is very small (10% of GDP). The fiscal loss 
implies by the privatization immediately translates into a decrease of already 
dismally low spending levels in essential public goods, infrastructures, 
schooling or health care. The social cost of public finance contraction is 
hence huge. Since corruption risk is also higher in poor countries, the result 
helps to explain the unpopularity of the reforms. In practice inefficient 
privatizations do occur in poor countries and entails extremely high social 
cost.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
standard micro-economics arguments for privatization. Section 3 presents 
Auriol and Picard (2002) macro-fiscal balancing results. Section 4 tests the 
theoretical implications of the model by contrasting them with the available 
empirical evidences on the provision of water and electricity in Africa. 
Section 5 presents the analysis of corruption in privatization. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Privatization and Internal Efficiency of the Firm  
Productive efficiency: Transfer of public ownership to private ownership 
has generally been grounded in the poor economic performance of public 
enterprises. A critical problem induced by public ownership, first identified by 
Kornai (1980), is the lack of any commitment on the part of the government 
not to bail out or subsidize money-losing firms. This commitment problem is 
referred to in literature on the subject as the soft-budget constraint. 
Interesting surveys are available in Kornai (2000), Kornai, Maskin and 
Roland (2002). Since less efficient firms are allowed to rely on the 
government for funding, they lack the financial discipline required for efficient 
management (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995, Schmidt 1996). Kornai (2001) 
provides evidence of the use of soft-budget constraints by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in developing countries. Another part of the theoretical 
literature stresses that public ownership is associated with a lack of 
economic orientation in governments' objectives. For instance, in Kornai and 
Weibull (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Debande and Friebel (2003), 
governments are described as adopting 'paternalistic' or political behaviour 
as they seek to protect or increase employment; in Shapiro and Willig 
(1990), governments are malevolent. The main conclusion of this theoretical 
literature is that privatization improves the internal efficiency of firms. 
Empirical evidence supports this result. Megginston and Netter (2001) offer 
an extensive review of the literature available on the subject covering 61 
empirical studies at company level (both within and across countries). They 
conclude that privately managed firms tend to be more productive and 
profitable than public firms in both developed and developing countries. This 
does not mean that privatization always improves firm performance. In three 
studies, looking at 204 privatizations in 41 countries, between 1/5 and 1/3 of 
privatized firms have registered very slight to no improvement, and even 
occasionally, worsening situations (Megginson and Netter 2001). However in 
all other cases reviewed privatization tend to improve firms’ performance.  
In developing countries, the gains from private sector involvement stem 
from better asset management and bills recovery.  Andres, Foster and 
Guasch (2006), who studied the impact of privatization of electricity 
distribution in 116 cases in 10 Latin American countries, show that 
privatization generates improvements in labour productivity, efficiency and 
product/service quality. These good performances, which occurred for most 
of them in the transition period between the public and the private regime, 
have been achieved through a substantial employment reduction (i.e., by 
more than 40%). Similarly Manibog et al (2003) in their review of the World 
Bank experience with private participation in the power sector show that over 
a five-year period, average plant availability in their sample increased 10 to 
40%, outage indicators decreased by more than half, and the number of 
customers per employee increased 50%. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
private operators have taken over retail supply, they have drastically 
reduced payment delays, theft, and unpaid bill. For instance unpaid bill were 
reduced from 30% to 12% for Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricité after the 
involvement of the private sector under a lease contract in 1990 (Manibog et 
al 2003). In water, a management contract was signed between Suez and 
Johannesburg Water in 2001 for the suburb of Soweto in South-Africa. As a 
result leakages and unaccounted-for-water losses decreased dramatically 
(Blanc and Ghesquières, 2006b). In Senegal, the network commercial rate 
(water paid over water produced) improved from 68% in 1996, year where a 
10-year lease contract was signed with SAUR, to 80% in 2006. Gassner, 
Popov and Pushak (2007) evaluate the impact of private sector participation 
(PSP) on firm performance in electricity distribution and water and sanitation 
services with a panel of 302 utilities with PSP and 928 utilities without PSP 
in 71 developing and transition countries. They also find that PSP decreases 
employment, has a strong impact on the efficiency of utility operations, on 
bill collection ratios and on improvement in the quality of service.  
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Allocative efficiency: It is indisputable that privatization tends to 
improve firms asset management and commercial performance. In contrast 
the assumption made by advocates of privatization, namely that efficiency 
gains are automatically transmitted to consumers, merits further discussion. 
In a perfectly competitive market where price equates marginal cost, it is true 
that consumers benefit from the efficiency gain generated by privatization. 
However, in increasing return to scale industries, moving from public to 
private ownership does not offer a solution to the lack of competitive 
pressure. In the absence of government intervention, firms with market 
power keep whatever costs’ reduction they generate for themselves.4 
Empirical studies hence reveal that privatization results in lower prices and 
higher output in competitive industries, but not in oligopolistic ones (see 
Nellis 1999).  
"Steep price increases following privatization have been quite common in 
divested network or infrastructure industries, e.g. electricity and water and 
sewerage, and common but not universal in telecommunications." (Birdsall 
and Nellis 2002) 
Prices are often increased ahead of privatization in order to reduce the 
SOEs financing gaps and attract buyers. This, for instance, was the case 
with electricity tariffs in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Senegal. In Senegal the 
government increased tariffs by 10% after reaching an agreement with 
Vivendi (see OECD-BAD 2003). An unaccounted part of price increases 
stemmed from the termination of illegal connections (Birdsall and Nellis 
2002, Estache et al 2002, OECD-BAD 2003). Similarly a recent study on the 
impact of privatization of electricity distribution in Latin America shows that 
privatization produced no changes for coverage and output once the authors 
control for firm-specific time trends. Although prices were hard to compare 
across companies, the results also suggest a rise in prices (Andres, Foster 
and Guasch 2006). Finally a review of the World Bank Group’s experience 
with private participation in the electricity sector shows that tariffs decreased 
for industry and commerce but have risen for other customers (Manibog et 
ali 2003).  
                     
4Newbery and Pollitt (1997) estimate the welfare consequences of the privatization of the UK electricity 
sector. They conclude that there were permanent gains equal to 5 percent of previous total generation 
costs, but at least in the first few years following privatization the new private shareholders reaped most 
of the gains, and both government/taxpayers and consumers lost out. Apparently government underpriced 
the shares in order to ensure political success. The outcry in Britain concerning the windfall gains to 
shareholders in this privatization helped Tony Blair’s Labour party regain power. It also led to the 
imposition of a special tax on the profit of the shareholders (see Birdsall and Nellis 2002). 
Regulation In increasing return to scale industries, such as water and 
electricity networks, traditional regulation literature recommends that a legal 
monopoly should be set to prevent wasteful duplication of investments. 
Moreover the legal monopoly should be regulated to avoid the deadweight 
loss created by monopoly pricing. Under the complete contract approach 
adopted in the regulation literature (see Laffont and Tirole 1993), there is no 
difference between public ownership and private ownership under regulation 
of entry and price. The result is important because it illuminates that 
ownership is not the key to the allocative efficiency problem; in increasing 
return to scale industries regulation is the key. Empirical evidence supports 
this result. Using a panel data for 51 developing countries, over the period 
1985 to 2000, Zhang et al (2002), study the effects of privatization, 
competition and regulation on the performance of electricity generation 
industry. They conclude that “the effect of privatization and having an 
independent regulator, separately, is statistically insignificant…; while the co-
existence of these two reforms does seem to be correlated with greater 
electricity availability, more generation capacity and higher labour 
productivity.” The result is worrying because governments in developing 
countries have not been very successful in establishing regulatory 
institutions. They usually lack the human resources, the experience and the 
credibility necessary to control large corporations. For instance in Latin 
America, the concessions that were granted to private operators following 
the divestiture of public firms were renegotiated after an average of only 2.1 
years (see Laffont 2001 and Guash, Laffont and Straub 2002). This problem 
is reinforced by the fact that, in practice, governments in SSA are not 
focused on consumer surplus.  
3. Privatization and macro-fiscal balancing 
Opportunity cost of public funds Government pursues multiple 
objectives, such as the production of public goods, the regulation of non 
competitive industries or the control of externalities, under a single budget 
constraint. Since in general the government budget constraint binds, the 
opportunity cost of the public funds, defined as the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the constraint and denoted λ, is strictly positive. Contrary to 
the price mechanism, government intervention is not, and cannot be, 
anonymous; it depends on λ. Concretely increasing investment in 
infrastructure such as electricity or water networks means decreasing the 
production of essential public goods such as national security, law 
enforcement, of commodities that generate externality such as health care 
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and education, or alternatively, increasing the level of taxes or debt. All 
these actions have a social cost, which must be traded off with the social 
benefit. Symmetrically when the government is able to tax an industry it can 
increase its investment in education, health care or other areas. The social 
benefit generated by this investment must be compared with the reduction in 
consumer surplus generated by taxes. The opportunity cost of public funds 
measures this cost. It is higher when, everything else being equal, 
government revenue is lower.5 Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is 
typically much lower in developing countries than in rich countries. The tax 
revenue-GDP ratio for 1995, for example, was 36.1 % for OECD countries 
(see official statistics on the OECD website) versus 18.2 % for developing 
countries (based on a sample Tanzi and Zee 2001). The difference in 
taxation level reflects the fact that developing countries are unable to match 
OECD countries’ direct taxation level. Other sources of public funds are 
crucial to them. This includes revenue from public firms. Symmetrically, 
subsidizing public utilities services is very costly. It must be justified by a 
high social return of the subsidy. In practice each euro that is transferred to a 
public firm costs 1+λ euros to society.  
Auriol and Picard (2002) offer a theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between the financial constraints of a country, captured by the opportunity 
cost of public funds, λ, and its optimal industrial policy. In the paper 
government assumes responsibility for a public firm's profit. It subsidizes it in 
case of loss and taxes it in case of benefit. In contrast managers and/or 
owners of privatized firms assume responsibility for the firm's cash flows. 
One benefit of privatization is that it reduces government subsidies to money 
loosing firms. However, privatization has a price. On the one hand, the 
government is unable to take advantage of positive cash flows in profitable 
firms. On the other hand, it abandons direct control of the firm's operations, 
especially prices, which has a cost to consumers. Privatization in developing 
countries is hence treated as the move from public ownership with regulation 
of entry and price to private ownership with price liberalization. One question 
addressed in the paper is whether the elimination of subsidies to unprofitable 
firms and the cash-flow generated by the sale can compensate for the price 
distortion associated with privatization and the loss of revenue from 
profitable public firms. The answer is positive. When public finance matters, 
privatization without price control can dominate a benevolent regulation. 
                     
5The opportunity cost of public fund is different from the marginal cost of public fund (i.e., the 
dead weight loss of increasing marginally a specific tax). The MCF is a general equilibrium 
concept. It is relevant in the long run because it indicates the social cost/benefit of tax reform 
(Warlters &Auriol 2005). 
Justifications for the assumptions above are provided in Auriol and Picard 
(2002). The paper considers both monopoly and duopoly structure. For the 
sake of simplicity we focus on the monopoly case. As explained in Section 4 
it is more realistic in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa utilities because they 
operate below efficiency level of scale.  
The model: On the production side, the cost function includes a sunk 
cost K>0.  It is large so that the market has a natural monopoly structure. 
The firm must make the investment K before discovering its idiosyncratic 
marginal cost c. The fixed cost K>0 is common knowledge; the marginal cost 
c is private information of the firm’s manager. The government, which does 
not observe c, has an a priori on the parameter. It is assumed to be 
independently drawn from the support 0,C⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  according to a uniform 
distribution.6 With a production level of Q, the firm has the following cost 
function: C(Q)=K+cQ. It maximizes the profit:  
Π(Q)=P(Q)Q-cQ-K+t,           (1) 
where P(Q)Q is the sales amount and t is the net transfer that it gets from 
the government (subsidy minus tax).  
On the consumer side, the demand is linear. The inverse demand for 
Q>0 units of the commodity is given by: P(Q)=a-bQ, where a>0 and b>0 are 
common knowledge. In order to rule out corner solution in the sequel it is 
assumed that 
A1     a 2c≥ .  
The gross consumer surplus, defined as the integral of the inverse 
demand function, is S(Q) =aQ-0.5bQ2. Let λ be the opportunity cost of public 
funds. The government is utilitarian. It maximizes the sum of consumer 
surplus, S(Q)-P(Q)Q, plus producer surplus, Π(Q) , minus the social cost of 
transferring public funds to the firm, (1+λ) t. Government's objective function 
is therefore:  
          W = S(Q)-cQ-K  - λt.     (2) 
The transfer to the firm, t, can either be positive (i.e., a subsidy), or negative 
(i.e., a tax). For λ close to 0, the government focuses on the net consumers' 
surplus (i.e., for λ=0 the government objective function is W=S(Q)-cQ-K). For 
                     
6 By contrast Auriol and Picard (2002) consider general distributions of marginal cost. 
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large λ the government puts more weight on the transfer and less on 
consumers’ surplus. In the limit it maximizes the revenue, t, it can extract 
from the firm. Under public ownership, denoted RM, the government's 
control rights on prices and quantities are associated with accountability on 
profits and losses. That is, it must subsidize the firm in case of losses 
whereas it taxes the firm in case of profits. In contrast, in the private regime, 
denoted PM, the government imposes no control on prices and quantities, 
and it takes no responsibility for the firm's profits or losses. Transfers are 
hence ruled out between the government and the private firm. 
Under private ownership the firm pays the sunk cost K, and chooses 
the laissez-faire monopoly quantity; QPM(c) = (a-c)/(2b). Under public 
ownership the government pays the sunk cost K, and chooses the regulated 
monopoly quantity, which under the situation of asymmetric information is: 
QRM(c)= (1+ λ)/(1+2λ) (a-cv)/b, where cv = c(1+2λ)/(1+λ), is the total 
marginal cost of service provision. We deduce that cv ≥ c. It is larger than c 
because it includes the cost of production, c, plus the cost of information 
revelation, cλ/(1+λ ). Consistently with empirical evidences, in the model 
private firms are more efficient than public firms. It is straightforward to 
check that when λ=0, the government, which maximizes consumers’ 
surplus, chooses QRM(c)=Q*(c)= (a-c)/b. This is the first best quantity 
obtained when price PP
c
RM equates marginal cost c. Symmetrically when λ 
goes to infinity the regulator maximizes the transfer it can extract from the 
firm.  He chooses the quantity and price of the monopoly evaluated at the 
virtual cost,  so that Qlim 2Vcλ →∞ = RM(c)=QPM(2c)<QPM(c) and 
PRMP (c)=PPPM(2c)>PPM(c). Let E denote the expectation operator with respect 
to the uniform distribution on c. Let V=E(a-c)2/(4b). One can check that the 
expected profit of the private monopoly is: EΠPM=V-K. The ex-ante welfare 
level under private ownership is  
EWPM =3/2V-K.     (3) 
 Similarly let VRM(λ)=E(a-cv)2/(4b), be V evaluated at cv instead of c. The ex-
ante welfare level under public ownership is  
EWRM(λ)= (1+ λ){(2+2λ) /(1+2λ)VRM(λ)-K}.    (4) 
The optimal choice between public and private ownership is obtained by 
comparing the two welfare functions (3) and (4). The optimal industrial policy 
corresponds to privatization if and only if EWPM > max{0,EWRM(λ)}.  
Figure 1 summarizes the monopoly results. On the horizontal axis 
there is the opportunity cost of public funds λ. On the vertical axis there is 
the sunk cost K, so that higher cost corresponds to less profitable segment 
market. The curve KRM represents the limit values of K above which the 
regulated monopoly is no longer valuable (i.e., such that EWRM<0). The 
curve KRM/PM represents the limit values of K under which the regulated 
monopoly is preferred to the private monopoly (i.e., such that EWPM < 
EWRM). In the hatched area denoted PM, the private unregulated monopoly 
is the optimal industrial policy; in the white area denoted RM the optimal 



































4. Testing the Model Predictions: Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 Auriol and Picard (2002) analysis is normative. The paper derives 
optimal industrial policy, which varies with the profitability of the market 
segments (i.e., with K on the vertical axis) and the opportunity cost of public 
funds (i.e., with λ on the horizontal axis). In the paper we want to test 
whether developing countries governments behave benevolently while 
managing their public utilities. We focus on water and electricity provision in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The null hypothesis is that government in Sub-Saharan 
Africa follows the optimal industrial policy derived in the paper. There is very 
little data available on water and electricity in Sub-Saharan African. We thus 
test the null hypothesis by confronting the theoretical predictions of the 
paper with available empirical evidences on industrial organization, mainly 
from the World Bank and the French Development Agency (AFD) reports 
and publications. We complete the relevant information on industrial 
organization structure, with case studies and empirical studies on prices and 
on demand. 
Return to scale in water and electricity Contrary to mobile 
telecommunication technology, electricity and pipe water industries still 
involve fixed connections between suppliers and customers. Water networks 
tend to constitute local natural monopoly because each city constitutes a 
distinct market. At the national level there are usually a multitude of local 
monopolies with different type of contracts and statuses. However at the 
international level, water industry is very concentrated. There are only four 
major companies that are operating in Sub-Saharan Africa: Thames Water, 
Vivendi, ONDEO, and SAUR, and two more at the worldwide level (Anglia 
Water and Yorkshire Water). Electricity networks tend to constitute national 
(or even regional) natural monopoly because they are more efficient when 
operated at larger scale.7 Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest electricity and 
water demand per capita in the world. Both water and power industries are 
operating below efficient level of scale. For instance Tovar and Trujillo 
(2005) study electricity generation between 1998 and 2001 in 13 countries 
(mostly East African). They show that inefficiencies of scale are in the order 
                     
7In the European electricity market, the economic liberalization has generated a wave of 
mergers and acquisitions leading to higher market concentration at both national and EU levels 
(Newbery 2002). More than two-third of the European markets is now in the hands of eight large 
companies, (Jamasb and Pollitt 2005). According to the European Commission (2005), among 
the EU-15, concentration in generation and in retailing for the largest three firms is above 60% 
in 10 and 12 markets, respectively. The Europe-wide four-firm concentration ratio is at 50%. 
of 24%. This result militates for more concentration in the electricity industry, 
and against reforms aimed at unbundling existing African utilities. In practice 
unbundling has only been experimented in Uganda and Kenya, without 
success. In Kenya, electricity production and distribution have been 
separated by the Electicity Act in 1997. Since the performance of Kenya 
Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), which is in charge of the power 
distribution, has been very poor, notably in access rate (only 15% of the 
population) and in financial performance, the Energy Sector Recovery 
Project in Kenya (2004) is not contemplating introducing competition in the 
distribution sector anymore. World Bank reforms to unbundle existing public 
electric utilities in Europe and Central Asia (ECA), which share many 
features with African utilities, have also been very unsuccessful. Re-
concentration into larger entities has been necessary in several cases 
(Manibog et ali 2003). Similarly water utilities are operating below efficient 
level of scale. Tynan and Kingdom (2005) study 270 world water and 
sanitation providers, including 83 African ones. In the African cases they 
found very significant scales efficiency effects. By doubling population 
served it only increases operation and maintenance costs by 61%. Similarly 
Estache and Kouassi (2002) study 21 African utilities in 1995-1997. They 
found that the average efficiency level, which is correlated with the utility 
size, is of 54%. These results militate for more concentration and integration. 
Water utilities have to expand their services by connecting more households 
and firms in area where they are already operating. Electricity utilities need 
also to grow and to absorb private sub-networks. This integration strategy 
will increase their productivity and decrease their costs. Based on these 
results we rule out duopolistic structure and focus on monopoly. 
Theoretical results Figure 1 shows that, depending on ?λ  and on λ? , 
optimal industrial policy might be different in rich and in poor countries. The 
privatization of natural monopoly with price liberalization dominates a 
benevolent regulation under public ownership for intermediate values of 
λ (e.g., for ? /, RM RM PM
?
K Kλ λ> > ). The relevance of the privatization result 
depends on what “intermediate” values means. If they are very high, in 
practice privatisation is never optimal. In order to test the theory we need to 
assess which values λ and λ?  take under the model assumptions. It turns out 
that the two threshold values depend solely on the ratio c /a. This ratio 
measures the ex-ante technological uncertainty. Indeed with a uniform 
distribution uncertainty rises with c (i.e., σ 2 = c 2/12). In Sub-Saharan Africa 
cost/demand uncertainty are exceptionally high, as shown by all international 
risk rating agencies. To take into account the SSA specific context we need 
to consider large values of c . However we are limited by the model’s 
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assumptions. In what follow we consider the lower bound of A1. The next 
result is shown in Appendix A.8  
Proposition 1: Let c =a/2, then ?λ =0.35 and λ? =1. 
In developed economies, λ is mainly equal to the deadweight loss 
accrued to imperfect income taxation. It is assessed to be around 0.3 
(Snower and Warren, 1996). In developing countries, low income levels and 
difficulties in implementing effective taxation programs are strong constraints 
on the government's budget, which leads to higher values of λ. As a 
benchmark case the World Bank (1998) suggests an opportunity cost of 0.9. 
The value is much higher in countries that are heavily indebted. The heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative currently identifies 40 
countries, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa.9 Governments of countries 
classified HIPC have an extremely high opportunity cost of public funds. In 
other words, under the model assumptions, most Sub-Saharan countries, 
especially HIPC, are on the right side of λ? in Figure 1. A likely exception is 
South Africa, which shares many features of advanced economies. The next 
result is shown in Appendix A. 
Proposition 2: Let λ ≥ λ? . Depending on market segments profitability 
three cases hold: 
(i) K >V: there is no service (nor private, or public).  
(ii)  KRM/PM(λ) <K  V: service is private and price is unregulated P≤ PM(c). 
(iii) K K≤ RM/PM(λ):  service is public and the regulated price, PRM(c), 
increases with λ  so that  ΕPPRM(c)>EPPM(c)  for λ> a/ c -0.5. 
The paper predictions which can be tested with stylized facts concern the 
ownership structure (public or private), the regulation of price (presence or 
absence) and the government transfer schemes (subsidies or taxes). 
Predictions vary with market segment profitability (higher value of K 
corresponds to less profitable segment market). We thus study how different 
income groups are served by public utilities and by private providers in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
                     
8Auriol and Picard (2002) do not compute λ? . Yet they show that ?λ varies between 0.35 and 
1.14 when c varies between a/2 and a/10.  
9 See Official HIPC website. 
 Model predictions: 
Unprofitable segment: The unprofitable part of the market is depicted on 
the upper part of figure 1. For K above V the private firm makes a loss. The 
optimal industrial policy involves public ownership for the low value of λ and 
no production for the high value. The public ownership case corresponds to 
the white area denoted RM which is under the curve KRM and above the line 
V. The no production area, which is labelled φ, is above the curve KRM and 
the profitability line V.10 We deduce from Proposition 1and 2: 
Prediction (i):  In poor Sub-Saharan African countries there is no service 
in unprofitable market segments (nor private, or public).  
The level of access rate of water and electricity is lower in SSA than in 
richer countries. Indeed electrification or connection to piped water in 
remote, low density area is achieved through subsidies (e.g., cross-
subsidies in some OECD countries). In poor countries the opportunity cost of 
the subsidies is higher than the social return of the investment. Since the 
private sector cannot break even, there is no service in poor and low density 
areas. People rely on self collected wood and water for their basic needs of 
water and energy. A study by the ABD on 13 Sub-Saharan countries hence 
shows that 63% of household energy consumption was wood in 1994.11 
This figure, which is based on surveys, is a rough estimate. The World Bank 
WDI 2007 statistical database reports that combustible renewable and waste 
was 56% of total energy consumption in SSA in 2004 (based on a sample of 
countries). In water the situation is somewhat comparable. Indeed in 2004 it 
was estimated that 44% of African did not have access to improve water 
source.12 Among the 56% of African who had access to “safe” water, 40% 
                     
10When ?λ <λ < λ? for the area which is comprised between the curve KRM/PM and KRM, the 
welfare would be higher with a private monopoly than with a public one. The problem is that a 
private firm is not willing to serve the market because it will make a loss. NGOs and 
international organizations might find useful in relatively wealthy countries to subsidize private 
firms to serve this unprofitable segment. 
11 See http://www.helio-international.org/Helio/anglais/reports/africa.html
12Access to improve water sources is defined as the availability of at least 20 liters per person 
per day from an improved source within 1 kilometer of the user's dwelling. Improved water 
source refers to a source that is likely to provide "safe" drinking water, such as a household 
connection, a borehole, public standpipe, protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater 
collection. It does not include unprotected well, unprotected spring, vendor provided water, 
bottled water, tanker truck water. For more on water supply and sanitation see WHO/UNICEF at 
http://www.wssinfo.org/en/welcome.html and http://www.wssinfo.org/en/233_wat_africaS.html. 
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rely on a borehole, public standpipe, protected dug well, protected spring, or 
rainwater collection. In other words, 84% of African did not have connection 
to piped water network in 2004. For the great majority of African households, 
wood and its derivatives constitute the only energy source, and self collected 
water the only water source. Children walk hours to assist their parents in 
these chores. For instance a study conducted in 2002-2003 in rural Guinea 
reveals that children between age 6 and 14 spend 4 hours per week on 
average collecting wood and water. Girls spend more time collecting water 
and boys spend more time collecting wood (Bardasi and Wodon 2006). 
Low profitability segment: When K varies between ( )RMV ∞  (i.e., the limit 
value of KRM/PM when λ goes to infinity) and the profitability line V, the 
profitability of the market segment is positive but low. The optimal industrial 
policy then is monotone in the opportunity cost of public funds. For low value 
public ownership dominates privatization, while the reverse is true of high 
opportunity cost. Governments with abundant fiscal resources subsidize the 
investment and let consumers use it at marginal cost. This policy maximizes 
the consumer surplus, which in the case of low opportunity cost of public 
funds, is equal to utilitarian social welfare. On the other hand, when the 
opportunity cost of public funds is high, the government objective function is 
titled towards transfers. Subsidizing infrastructure with low social return is 
costly. Privatization is an appealing alternative to public provision. Consider 
the limit case where the government cannot finance an infrastructure, for 
instance small water network or generation facility. If a private firm is eager 
to do it in exchange for the freedom to charge monopoly pricing it is optimal 
to let the firm do so. Indeed, it is better to have a privately owned and 
operated infrastructure, even with the monopoly distortion, than no 
infrastructure at all. This is the same logic which is at work in patent 
allocation. By continuity the result still holds when the government is able to 
finance the infrastructure.  
Prediction (ii): In poor Sub-Saharan African countries service to low 
profitability market segments is left to the private sector and is unregulated. 
Because SSA countries have large opportunity costs of public funds, they 
implement industrial policies that strongly differ from those favoured in 
developed economies. There is a public good aspect and externalities 
associated to sunk cost investment such as infrastructure. As recommended 
by standard economic theory, wealthy nations subsidize the construction of 
most infrastructures and let people use them at marginal cost. With a low 
opportunity cost of public funds this policy maximizes welfare. By contrast 
countries plagued by financial problems cannot follow this strategy. Private 
provision of utilities services is hence fairly common in SSA.  
Formal privatizations and public and private partnerships (PPP) between 
governments and international firms, have attracted a lot of attention and 
mobilised a lot of resources from international organizations.13 Not only the 
reforms have been expensive to design and implement, but they also were 
often unsuccessful. A striking example is EDM in Mali where a management 
and a concession contract have successively been signed and terminated 
over 10 years period. The result is a tremendous backlog in water and 
electricity. As Tremolet (2005) writes, ‘The conflict between the private 
operator and the Malian Government regarding the terms of the contract and 
EDM’s obligations has mobilized a considerable amount of time and 
resources by comparison with the overall impact of EDM’s contribution […] 
EDM only provides services to 10% of the Malian population’. In Sub-
Saharan Africa the preferred arrangements for formal private participation in 
water industry have been concession and lease contracts (PPP with risk 
sharing for rehabilitation and extension of an existing infrastructure). In 
electricity Estache and Wodon (2006) report that over the period 1990-2003 
greenfield contracts (Build Operate and Transfer) have been the most 
popular type of PPPs. However Appendix B, which reviews official PPP, 
shows that there are not many of them. Formal contracts are only the tip of 
the iceberg. There are thousands of small scale providers of water and 
electricity services operating informally. They did not receive much attention 
from aid agencies and academia. Yet, they are filling the service gap in low 
profitability segments.  
In the water sector returns to scale are lower than in electricity. Water 
networks constitute natural local monopoly. Since it is easier to produce a 
service at small scale, small-scale operators play a very important role in 
peri-urban areas of capitals cities. A recent survey of 400 documents 
(articles, reports, case studies) by Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) estimates 
that nearly half of urban dwellers in Africa rely on such private services 
(mainly point source systems or vendors). Small-scale providers of water 
have hence been documented in Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Case studies confirm the 
                     
13For instance in Eastern Europe the World Bank spent US$ 100 million on technical 
assistance for reforming, without success, the power sectors in Ukraine (Manibog et al. 2003). 
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survey. For instance in Maputo a recent study shows that some 100 local 
informal entrepreneurs have invested in 200 small networks. Their access 
rate in the two poorest quintiles is comparable to the access rate achieved 
by the national operator, Aguas de Mozambique, in the richest quintiles even 
though they do not receive any subsidy for their operation.14 As predicted by 
the theory the private providers are bridging the public service gap at a high 
cost. They are unregulated and do not receive any subsidy so that the price 
of their service is much higher than the public utilities price.15 For instance a 
study in the city of Niamey shows that the average price paid for water by 
the poorest 20% households is roughly 2.6 times higher than the price paid 
by the richest 20% (Bardasi and Wodon 2006). Similarly a case study in the 
city of N’Djamena shows that the corporation of water caters is well 
organized. It behaves as a cartel and applies the monopoly pricing. On 
average the water is sold with a markup of 3.5 times the price at which it is 
purchased from the regulated public utility (Bernadac 2005). Kariuki and 
Schwartz (2005) show that the average price per cubic meter in Africa is less 
than US$0.5 for utilities and around US$4.75 for carter vendors.  
In electricity, small-scale providers of energy have been documented in 
Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Kariuki and Schwartz 
2005). However many large consumers (i.e., firms) overcome the problem 
posed by the lack of power, by owning or sharing a generator. Investment 
Climate Assessments, which draw upon the results of enterprise surveys to 
prioritize constraints to business, show that 40% of the establishments 
surveyed in the region own or share a generator.16 This extreme form of 
privatization, which yields a very high cost per Kwh, occurs because the 
power penury is acute. On average in the sample, it takes 52.6 days to 
obtain an electrical connection; there are 50.5 days of electrical outages 
generating losses evaluated at 9% of sales. Once they are self-sufficient, 
firms tend to focus on others problems than electricity. For instance in Kenya 
71% of the firms surveyed own or share a generator. Electricity is thus 
ranked 9 (one of the “best” score in the sample) among the 19 possible 
constraints. These results are far from exhaustive. The number of surveyed 
                     
14 AFD-Hydroconseil-SEURECA (2005). 
15Dardenne (2006) objects that competition among water tankers and carters can in some 
cases keep the profit margin low (e.g., US$ 2-3 per day for carters in Nouakchott, Bamako or 
Ouagadougou). Nevertheless, prices are still higher for poor customers than rich ones. 
16Surveyed countries are Benin, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia  http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/icas.aspx
establishments in each country is fairly small (266 on average). The 
selection, which is based on tax records, targets firms from big cities and 
from the formal sector. Informal businesses and rural areas which are the 
core of Sub-Saharan economy are not in the surveys. Finally the study does 
not consider domestic consumers. They often rely on small-scale providers 
for basic lighting service and/or for batteries.  
Until now, economists and international organizations have 
overlooked the private informal firms in water and electricity sectors. For the 
future it would be very useful to conduct systematic studies on the extent of 
their services. The objective should be to target some of these local 
providers and to encourage them to expand their services and to become 
formal, notably by lending them money,17 while in exchange controlling their 
prices. A good example can be found in small cities of Mauritania, where 
local operators have signed 3-year delegated management contracts with a 
central body, ANEPA. Thus 300 independent small scale operators serve 
more than half of the population, have invested $5 million, and outperform 
water services in larger cities (managed by the national water company) on 
access rates and other key indicators.18
Profitable segment: When the public utility is profitable the optimal 
industrial policy is non-monotone in the opportunity cost of public funds. 
When the opportunity cost of public funds is low, the government sets prices 
close to marginal cost and subsidizes the regulated firm to cover fixed costs. 
Rises in the opportunity cost of public funds increase the social cost of such 
transfers. The government prefers to let a private firm take over for 
intermediate values. Finally, for large values the government, which focuses 
on revenue, prefers to keep profitable firms public rather than to sell them 
off. Prices are set close to the private monopoly level in order to maximize 
profit and thus government revenue. The fiscal argument works for every 
country in the world. Governments of advanced economies care for the 
revenues generated by their utilities.19 The difference between them lies in 
                     
17Kariuki and Schwartz (2005), who survey 400 documents (articles, reports, case studies), 
show that small-scale private providers of water and electricity are severely credit constraint. 
18See AFD-Hydroconseil (2002). See also AFD-BPD- Hydroconseil  (2006). 
19In the USA a federal excise tax on local and long distance telephony services was created in 
1898. It has been repealed occasionally and re-enacted ever since. The tax’s opponents argue 
that it is regressive and distortive, while its proponents insist on the need for revenues in order 
to reduce federal budget deficits. It is hard to get around this argument: at a tax rate of 3% tax 
collection reached USD 5.185 billions in fiscal year 1999 (reported in budget of the United 
States Government, fiscal year 2000). 
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the weight that this argument assumes. As they are not able to tax as 
efficiently as advanced economies, developing countries need the additional 
revenues more badly.  
Prediction (iii): In poor Sub-Saharan African countries public utilities 
serve profitable market segments only. Regulated prices are set high to 
extract rents out of the wealthy customers. On average they are larger than 
private monopoly prices. 
In 2002 access to electricity was estimated at 24% of the total population 
by the International Energy Agency. This figure has to be compared with 
48% in comparable low income countries (IEA 2004). On a sample of 48 
African countries, Estache and Goicoechea (2005) find average access rate 
to be as low as 15% of the total population, against 31% in other low income 
countries. The situation is worse in rural areas where they estimate average 
access rate at 8%; the IEA estimates it at 5%. The discrepancy in the 
estimates is not surprising. It reflects the deficit of hard information available 
on the region. The IEA, which collect information on energy worldwide is 
usually fairly exhaustive, do not provide any information on many SSA 
countries.20 Whatever the exact level, satellite pictures at night clearly show 
that, at the exception of South Africa and of some capital cities, the continent 
is devoid of electric power.21 Similarly in 2004 the percentage of household 
with a connection to piped water network was estimated at 16% in SSA. In 
sanitation the percentage of household with an access to sanitation network 
was estimated around 8% by the WHO/UNICEF monitoring program.22 
Consistently with (iii) connected people to public utilities are the rich. A 
recent study by Diallo and Wodon (2005) of 26 African countries shows that 
the connection rate to piped water is nil in the first (poorest) quintile. In the 
second quintile it is nil in 23 countries. In the third quintile, it is still nil in 18 
countries, and below 3% in three additional countries; it is 26% in Cote 
d’Ivoire, 17% in Comores, 7% in Kenya, 9% in Namibia, and 16% in South 
Africa. In the fourth quintile, connection rate are still below 5% in 19 
countries; the access rate in the 7 remaining countries is above 20%. Finally 
one has to move to the fifth quintile to find positive access rate in all of the 
countries. In other words, access rate to piped water is almost 0% in the first 
three quintile of income group in 21 countries. This figure is consistent with 
                     
20Namely Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda  http://www.iea.org/Textbase/country/11_country.asp
21See http://www.junglephotos.com/africa/afspace/continent/africaday.shtml
22 See http://www.wssinfo.org/en/333_san_africaS.html. 
the WHO/UNICEF statistics which put at 16% the share of African with an 
access to piped water.  
Based on the normative analysis, the biggest concern with African public 
utilities is their commercial and pricing policy. In line with the theory, they 
focus on the wealthy segment of the demand, but contrary to the paper 
recommendation they do not make a profit out of it. According to the model 
prediction they should charge a price above the private monopoly price. Yet 
public utilities services are subsidized which is in total contradiction with the 
normative results. It signals a capture problem of the public utilities by the 
local elite. The under pricing problem is striking in water. Empirical studies 
show that there is a strict negative relationship between income and the 
price of water m3 in SSA. For instance a study in the city of Niamey shows 
that households pay on average in the first quintile FCFA 645/m3, in the 
second FCFA 541/m3, in the third FCFA 509/m3, in the fourth FCFA 
422/m3, and in the fifth FCFA 249/m3. Differences are even larger if shares 
of water budget in the household budget are compared (Bardasi and Wodon 
2006). Similarly the survey of different papers and cases studies on small-
scale private service providers by Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) shows that 
the average price per cubic meter in Africa is less than US$0.5 for utilities 
and around US$4.75 for carter vendors. It has been estimated that water 
utility need to charge at least a price of US$1 per cubic meter in developing 
countries to cover operating, maintenance and most investment needs 
(Foster and Yepes 2006). The financial gap is closed with scarce public 
funds and with the suppression of investment in maintenance and in network 
extension. With the poor paying up to 10 time the price of the rich, doubling 
the price of piped water in Sub-Saharan Africa and collecting the bills is not 
only a matter of efficiency, it is also a matter of justice. Such increase in tariff 
is possible because it has been implemented in many other developing 
countries. For instance in Uruguay residential water tariffs were raised in 
nominal term at an average annual rate of 25% (15% in real term) over the 
period 1997-2003 (Foster and Yepes 2006). Tariff increase should be easier 
in SSA because only the rich are connected. 
In electricity the pricing situation is somewhat better. Comparing the two 
industries, Foster and Yepes (2006) estimate that low income countries are 
69% to achieve some degree of cost recovery in electricity, while they are 
only 12% in water. This difference is explained by the fact that electricity 
tariffs are proportionally higher than water tariffs. Average electricity tariffs in 
high income countries are twice as high as those in low-income countries; in 
water they are nine times higher. It remains that in most African countries 
tariffs are too low to fully recover the costs. To be able to invest more the 
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public utilities tariffs have to be raised. For instance in Rwanda the per kwh 
price has been multiplied by two by the national electricity firm. Electricity 
utilities should also develop non linear tariffs for large customers, such as 
peak load pricing, to smooth demand and to deal more efficiently with the 
penury of power. Non linear tariffs are also useful to maximize profit and to 
shield the poorest consumers from the burden of the necessary price rises. 
Contrary to water, there are some evidence of a positive relationship 
between consumption of electric power and wealth. Sophisticated pricing 
policies obviously require metering of consumption. Finally there is no point 
in raising tariffs if commercial performances are not improved first. The 
problem of bills collection is massive in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance in 
Bangui (RCA), SODECA in water and ENERCA in electricity manage to 
charge only 30% of the amounts they produce. If this rate was improved to a 
reasonable 70%, more than 1 Million euros in water and 5 Million euros in 
electricity would be spared annually. Similarly in Kinshasa (RDC) the 
collection rate of REGIDESO (water) is 35% and SNEL (electricity) is 30%. It 
is hard to assess the impact of decades of inadequate pricing policy. 
However public utilities which are making losses cannot invest so that in the 
long run, access is too low. This is especially true in electricity. Not only did 
SSA have the lowest per capita consumption of electricity in the world, but 
international comparisons reveal that access rate in SSA is half of the 
access rate in peer low income countries. 
5. Inefficient Privatization 
The preceding analysis shows that public utilities are not optimally 
managed in SSA. Prices are too low. Moreover the government and the elite 
do not pay their bills. This situation clearly suggests a capture problem: the 
powerful and wealthy subsidize their consumption of utilities services with 
scarce public funds. We are obliged to reject the null hypothesis that African 
governments are managing optimally their public utilities. The problem is that 
the same ruling elite is responsible for designing and implementing 
privatization programs. There is thus some concern about the optimality of 
privatization programs designed by corrupt/inefficient people. Indeed much 
more profit can be made by selling out public utilities assets than by simply 
capturing them. This point is emphasized by Stiglitz (2002) 
“…in many countries today privatization is jokingly referred to as 
‘briberisation’. If a government is corrupt, there is little evidence that 
privatization will solve the problem. After all, the same corrupt government 
that mismanaged the firm will also handle the privatization. In country after 
country, government officials have realised that privatization meant that they 
no longer needed to be limited to annual profit skimming. By selling a 
government enterprise at below market price, they could get a significant 
chunk of the asset value for themselves rather than leaving it for subsequent 
office holders.”  Stiglitz (2002) 
There are anecdotal evidences documenting corruption in privatization 
programs in many developing countries. This is the case in Latin America.23 
For instance Boehm and Polanco (2003) report corruption in water utilities in 
Argentina and in Brazil. This is also the case in transition countries, as 
documented by Turnovec (1999) for the Czech Republic, and in Asia. 
Boehm and Polanco (2003) report corruption in privatization of water utilities 
in Manila, Hall (1999) reports corruption in the allocation to private firms of 
Jakarta water concessions and in Indonesia electricity contracts. Finally this 
is also true in SSA. For instance Société Tchadienne d’Eau et d’Electricité 
signed in 2000 with Vivendi a management contract that came to an abrupt 
end in 2004 after 4 years of suspicious practices by many actors, funds 
wasted by donors and rumours of corruption about the Sedigui oil project. In 
Uganda, revelations about corruption in privatization brought the resignation 
of the privatization minister and the parliament in late 1998 chose to 
suspend the entire privatization process until it had completed an inquiry.24 
Finally inefficient privatizations might occur because of incompetence. 
Indeed privatizations have often been imposed as part of structural 
adjustment programs. Governments were put under pressure by 
international organizations to downsize the public sector. In the haste to 
comply, some bad deals might have been cut.25
Corruption and/or incompetence in privatization yield costs both for tax-
payers and for consumers. In what follows we assess the social loss 
generated by inefficient privatization. It is not possible to assess it by 
classical statistical techniques. There is no data on the extent of the 
problem. Moreover it is hard to benchmark performance. Nobody knows 
what would have been the social welfare if the most efficient industrial 
structure had been adopted. We rely on theoretical analysis to uncover this 
                     
23 For a theoretical analysis see Martimort and Straub (2007) and for a test Bonnet et al (2007). 
24See http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/141priv.htm  
25 Henisz and Zelner (2004) analyze the coercive role played by donors and international 
lending institutions in private electricity projects. They focus on the resistance to the multilateral 
influence on reform and its impact on the probability of contract term renegotiation/ contestation. 
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out of equilibrium information. We study what happens if the government 
privatizes a profitable firm’s segment which, according to the normative 
analysis, should remain public. In the model inefficient privatization occurs 
when K K≤ RM/PM(λ) in Figure 1. Indeed in this case public ownership 
dominates private ownership. The welfare loss generated by inefficient 
privatization is denoted L(λ)=EWRM(λ)−EWPM. It depends on the opportunity 
cost of public funds.  Let ( )V RM ∞ = E[(a-2c)2]/(4b).  The next result is shown in 
Appendix C. 
Proposition 3: Let K ≤ KRM/PM(λ) and let λ ≥ ?λ .The loss function of 
privatization is  
 
  

























Figure 2: Loss Function of Inefficient Privatization 




Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3. Appendix C shows that L(λ) is strictly 
convex. It first decreases, reaches a minimum at λ∗, and then increases. The 
appendix shows that for c
                     
=a/2, λ∗ varies between 0.37 and 1 when K varies 
between 0 and a2/(18b). In other words under the model assumptions, SSA 
countries tend to be on the right side of λ∗. 
The benefit to a private firm of inefficient privatization is fixed: EΠPM=V-K. 
By contrast the social loss depends on the opportunity cost of public funds 
and is unbounded. It diverges with λ. Loosing public utilities profit centres is 
socially extremely costly in very poor countries. In practice the loss is 
mitigated because one does not move from optimal regulation to laissez-
faire monopoly. As we previously shown many inefficiencies occur in the 
management of public utilities. It remains that a corrupted government will 
choose to privatize the profit centres and the best performing public firms. To 
maximize the bribes it will do so in exchange of monopoly power. 
  It is hard to find empirical evidences to assess the result of Proposition 
3. Nevertheless inefficient privatization yields a fiscal cost. Private investors 
target profit centres so that public utilities restructuring, aimed at 
encouraging private participation in developing countries, has resulted in 
cream-skimming. The private firms took over large urban areas, while 
abandoning unprofitable rural segments. Consistently with the theory, the 
result has been an increase in the fiscal costs of the sector when the profit 
centres used to finance cross-subsidies were handed out to the private 
sector (Estache and Wodon 2006). There are also significant evidences of 
higher net fiscal cost associated with the privatization of public utilities profit 
centre in Latin America (Trujillo et ali 2003). Another result is to exacerbate 
regional disparities when territorial cross-subsidies are abandoned.26
The second piece of evidence concerns the nature and extent of private 
investment. According to the theory tight budget constraints imply that 
privatization may be optimal for low profitability segments of the industry 
(case (ii) in Proposition 2). However for profitable segments (i.e., for 
K K≤ RM/PM(λ)) the combination of allocative inefficiency and critical 
budgetary conditions favour public ownership. Yet if the government is 
corrupted or incompetent it carries out socially inefficient privatization, 
possibly in exchange of a bribe. This result implies that virtuous 
governments should find difficult to attract investors simply because they sell 
26In Uganda, about 40 water services are operated by local private operators who recover their costs from 
user charges without any cross subsidies between centers. By contrast, in Côte d’Ivoire, 600 semi urban 
centers are operated with a cross subsidy scheme at the national level. 
26 
the least profitable segments of their public utilities. By contrast corrupted 
government should attract more easily private investors because they focus 
on selling public firms profit centres. Consistently with this result, Ghosh 
Banerjee, Oetzel and Ranganathan (2006) find empirically that more corrupt 
countries attract more private infrastructure participation than less corrupt 
countries. According to their computation one unit increase in the index 
measuring corruption implies 31% more infrastructure investment.27  
The final piece of evidence concerns the unpopularity of privatization. In 
developing countries there is a widespread perception that the reforms have 
hurt the poor, notably through increases in prices and unemployment, while 
benefiting the powerful and wealthy. For example, the poling firm 
Latinobarometro, which conducts each year surveys among 19,000 people 
in 18 Latin American countries, revealed that 80 % of respondents viewed 
privatization negatively in 2003. Similarly surveys from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
post-communist transition states and South Asia show a strong popular 
opposition to privatization policies (Kikeri and Kolo 2005). Privatization 
reforms have even been qualified, including by Gabonese Interior Minister 
Louis Gaston Mayila, as "economic recolonization", due to the participation 
of foreign firms in many cases. The progress of democracy implies that in a 
few countries government have been overturned by the unpopularity of the 
reforms, either through election or military coup. This negative appraisal 
contrasts sharply with the positive view among some specialists (see 
Section 2). Since they think that the reforms have been successful, they 
conclude that they have not been understood by the people. They are 
unhappy with privatization because of irrational belief and ideology. However 
African people are not against private providers. As explained earlier, utilities 
services are more market oriented in SSA than in other regions in the world. 
The small, informal providers, which are closing the utilities service gap at a 
high cost, benefit from a positive image in the population. They are close to 
the people and responsive to their needs (notably in payment scheme). 
Consistently with (ii) they offer a valuable service that would not exist 
otherwise. This is well understood by Africans. By contrast the direct 
economic benefits of public utilities privatization have been minimal. Over 
                     
27 The partial sale of SEEG, the public electricity and water utility of Gabon, to local firms (19%) 
and Gabonese people (15%) is an example of how a success story might be transformed into a 
failure. Because the public firm had a good reputation, the demand for the shares has been so 
high that the government has been obliged to ration their allocation (AFD 2006). The problem is 
that President Omar Bongo cumulates the role of regulator and shareholders (he owns 3.5% of 
SEEG). Some analysts are concerned by the excessive amount of dividends paid to 
shareholders. They are draining the firm profits, which is unable to invest anymore. 
 
the period 1992-2003, the continent managed to attract only 4% of total 
international investment in infrastructure (World Bank 2004).28 Private firms, 
which were expecting rate of return of 16% or more, have generally been 
disappointed by the profits they could secure in developing countries. 
Discouraged by the unpopularity of their action and the changes in policy 
that unfolds (see Harris 2003), many of them have retreated from the utility 
services. This has for instance been the case for Véolia in Guinea, for Saur 
in Mali, for Hydro-Québec and Elyo in Sénégal, and for Biwater in Tanzania. 
The secrecy with which many sales were concluded fuelled the public 
perception that privatization benefited foreign investors or local 
entrepreneurs with political connections.  
7. Conclusion 
The paper focuses on private provision of public utilities services located 
in poor countries with a special attention to capture and corruption issues. It 
confronts Auriol and Picard (2002) optimal policy regarding private sector 
involvement in public utilities with empirical evidences on water and 
electricity in SSA. It helps to distinguish 3 cases. First, for the great majority 
of African households, wood and its derivatives constitute the only energy 
source, and carried water the only water source. This is not inconsistent with 
an efficient management of public funds because the social cost of 
subsidizing public services in poor remote area is much larger than the 
social benefit. Financing essential public goods, basic health care and 
education, is more important than building low return infrastructures.29 
Second, services provision is more market oriented in SSA than in OECD 
countries. Indeed the middle class and the poor generally are not connected 
to public utility so that they do not get any subsidy. They get a service 
because they are ready to pay for it and because local businesses are ready 
to invest to provide it. In light of the financial constraint faced by most African 
governments, it is a second best to let them serve freely the less profitable 
segments of the market. In other words, Laissez-faire in low profitability 
segments is not inconsistent with an efficient management of scarce public 
funds. It is then wrong to stigmatize the small private providers because their 
                     
28Most international financing went to East Asia (44%) before the East Asia crisis and after the 
crisis to Latin America, Europe and Central Asia. 
29It is worth noting that advanced economies do not provide access to tap water and electricity 
to all. If people in isolated locations want services they either finance the connecting cost, or 
build their own facilities. Otherwise they have to move to more densely populated area. 
28 
prices are high. They offer an important service that the government is 
unable to provide. The paper contributes to illuminate the positive role they 
play in this respect. They are de facto fairly popular among their customers. 
By contrast public utilities serve only the rich, but represent a fiscal burden to 
all. It is a matter of justice and efficiency to increase public utilities revenues 
to subsidize investment and fiscal relief. The paper hence shows that prices 
are set to favour the powerful and wealthy rather than taxing them. In other 
words, the public utilities are captured by the ruling elite. Privatizations 
occurring in countries where public utilities are so poorly managed are very 
unlikely to be efficient. Indeed public utilities reforms such as privatization 
are not trivial to set. They must take into account the fiscal constraint faced 
by developing countries. Privatizing profit centres or profitable public firms in 
exchange of bribes entails huge social costs in very poor countries. The 
analysis hence illuminates that there are socially good privatizations and that 
there are bad ones. The good ones are hard to formalize in practice because 
they are not very lucrative for the private sector. By contrast the bad ones, 
which presumably dominate, are easier to achieve. They are also very 
unpopular.   
 
 
 APPENDIX A: Proof of Proposition 1 and 2 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Auriol and Picard show that when c=0 and c =a/2 
then ?λ =0.35.30  To complete the proof of Proposition 1 we need to show that λ=1.  
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This second degree equation admits two roots: 
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Part (i):  implies that private production is not possible, andK V> ?λ λ>  
implies that ( )RM Vλ < ( )RMK because K λ  is decreasing in λ  (see Auriol and 
Picard 2002) and ?λ  is such that ( )RMK Vλ = , so that public production is 
suboptimal. 
Part (ii): K V≤  implies that private production is possible  
implies that private production is strictly better than public production. 
( )/RM PMK Kλ <
Part (iii): ( )/RM PMK K λ≤ implies that public production is better than private 
production. The prices yield: 
                     
30Auriol and Picard (2002) rely on simulation to compute the threshold value ?λ . Depending on the 
technological uncertainty (e.g., on c varying between 0 and a/2), it lies in [0.35, 1.14]. 
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APPENDIX B:  Public Private Partnership in SSA in Water and Electricity  
In Africa it has been difficult to attract international investors. Private 
participation into traditional public utilities has not been limited to investment. 
Many private firms have been involved into the management of the utilities under 
leases or concessions contracts without actually owning any asset in firm. For 
instance the World Bank has often favoured performance management contracts, 
rather unsuccessfully. The paper extents the definition of Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) to encompass all situations where the private sector is involved into the 
provision of utilities services, whether it is formally or not. We use the words 
“privatization” and “private participation” to refer to the situations where a private 
operator provides utility services. This ranges from official contracts between 
government and international firms to laissez-faire. Official forms of PPPs contracts 
are Operation and Maintenance (i.e., management) contracts, lease or “affermage” 
contracts; Build and Operate; Build and Finance; Build, Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) and Concession contracts. 
B1. Typology of Private Sector Participation in Water Utilities. 
1. International Operators in Big Cities (contract31 in operation or to be signed):  
- Ivory Coast (a concession contract was signed with Saur in early 1959 for 
Abidjan, and has evolved into various PPP arrangements until a 20-year 
affermage contract was signed in 1989 for all urban cities) 
- Senégal (affermage with concession elements signed with Saur in 1996; 
renewed in 2006) 
- Gabon (20-year concession contract signed with Véolia in 1999) 
- Mozambique (15-year lease contract signed in 1999 with Saur / Aguas de 
Portugal / private Mozambican investors. Saur withdrew in 2002) 
- Niger (affermage contract signed with Véolia in 2001) 
- Maroc (Ondéo in Casablanca / Véolia in Rabat-Salé and Tanger-Taitouan) 
31 Operating and Maintenance or Management contracts in italic.  
 
- Zambia (Copper Belt: management contract with Saur in 2001. Still in 
operation?) 
- Rwanda (5-year management contract signed in 2003 with Lahmeyer) 
- Cameroun (Public Offer phase for affermage) 
- Madagascar (Public Offer phase for affermage; management contract with 
Lahmeyer still in operation) 
-  Ghana (5-year management contract signed in 2005 by publicly-owned 
operators Vitens / Rand)  
- Burkina Faso (5-year management contract in 2001 with Véolia / Mazars 
& Guérard) 
2. International Operators in Big Cities (contract1 terminated or not renewed)  
- Mali (Management contract in 1995 with Saur/EDF/Hydroquebec/CRC-
Cogema terminated in 1997; Concession contract signed with Saur in 2000 
for Bamako and 16 urban centres; terminated by Saur in 2005) 
- Guinea (A lease contract was signed with Saur / CGE in 1989 for Conakry 
and 16 cities; terminated by government in 2002) 
- Republic of Centrafrique (affermage contract signed with Saur in 1991; 
terminated by Saur) 
- Tchad (Véolia signed a 30-year management contract in 2000 which was 
supposed to evolve through a privatisation process; terminated by Vivendi 
in 2004) 
- Cap Vert (50-year concession contract signed with Aguas de Portugal; in 
crisis) 
- Tanzania (Dar es Salam : the lease contract signed with Biwater in 2003 
was terminated by the government in 2005)  
- Uganda (management contract with Ondéo 2002-2004 for Kampala) 
- South Africa (Johannesbourg : 5 year management contract with Ondéo in 
2001) 
- Sao Tome & Principe (Safege, subsidiary of Suez/Dumez, signed a 
management contract in 1992 which was terminated in 1995 
3. International Operators in Small Cities (contract1 still in operation):  
- Kenya (Malindi – O&M contract signed with Gauff in 1995, followed by a 
management contract in 1999) 
- South Africa (Queenstown : O&M contract signed with Ondéo in 1992; 
Nelspruit : concession contract signed with Biwater in 1992 ; Dolphin 
Coast : concession contract signed with Saur in 1999) 
- Mozambique (Aguas de Portugal signed in 2001 a 5-year affermage 
contract for 4 secondary cities: Beira, Quelimane, Nampula, Pemba. 
Studies about the next scheme are not finalised yet) 
4. Small Scale Providers Documented in Small Cities: 
- Ghana 
- Mauritania  
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5. Small Scale Providers Documented in Periurban Areas:  
- Tchad 
- Mali 
- Kenya (Kibera, Kisumu) 





- Burkina Faso 
- Ivory Coast 
- Ethiopia 
- Ghana 












6. Community based Providers Documented in Rural Areas: 
- Mali 
- Burkina Faso 
- Tchad 
B2. Typology of Private Sector Participation in Electricity Utilities in Africa 
(without IPP). 
1. International operators in Big Cities (contract32 in operation):  
- Gabon (20-year concession contract signed with Véolia in 1999) 
- Cameroun (20-year concession contract signed with AES in 2001) 
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- Ivory Coast (15-year concession contract with more affermage elements 
signed in 1990 by Saur – EDF; renewed) 
- Equatorial Guinea (society for production and distribution has mixed 
capital from the State and Infinsa) 
- Togo (10-year concession contract for distribution and some production 
signed with HydroQuébec / Elyo in 2000; under stress) 
- Rwanda (5-year management contract signed in 2003 with Lahmeyer) 
- Kenya (2-year management contract signed with Manitoba Hydro in 2005) 
2. International Operators in Big Cities (contract2 terminated or not renewed) 
- Senegal (concession contract signed with HydroQuébec / Elyo in 1999; 
terminated in 2000; further privatisation was unsuccessful) 
- Cap Vert (50-year concession contract signed with Aguas de Portugal; in 
crisis) 
- Mali (Management contract in 1995 with Saur/EDF/Hydroquebec/CRC-
Cogema terminated in 1997; Concession contract signed with Saur in 2000 
for Bamako and 33 urban centres; terminated by Saur in 2005) 
- Tchad (Véolia signed a 30-year management contract in 2000 which was 
supposed to evolve through a privatisation process; terminated by Vivendi 
in 2004) 
3. PPP with Regional Private Sector: 
- Uganda (Eskom has signed a concession contract for production in 2002) 
- Uganda (Umeme, a private local company, is in charge of distribution since 
2001) 
- Zimbabwe (investment by Eskom) 
- Malawi (2.5-years management contract signed in 2001 with Eskom) 
- Tanzania (2-year management contract with NetGroup Solutions from 
South Africa; extended until 2005) 
- Lesotho (management contract signed by SAD-ELEC) 
4. Small Scale Providers Documented in Periurban Areas or Small Cities: 
- Ivory Coast 
- Senegal 
- Somalia 










APPENDIX C: Proof of Proposition 3 
By assumption 
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We deduce that ( )L λ  reaches its minimum for *λ  so that ( )'L λ = 0 . It is 
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